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1 | Introduction
In  this  article,  I  attempt  to  show the  presence  of  certain  structuralist
concepts  developed  by  the  linguist  and  semiotician  Roman  Jakobson  in
Merleau-Ponty’s  Phenomenology of Perception. There are no direct references
to Jakobson in Phenomenology of Perception, and the aforementioned presence
therefore is best considered as a convergence of interests and ideas.1 Certain
key  themes  of  Merleau-Ponty’s  work  can  be  rewardingly  translated  into
Jakobsonian terms, in particular Jakobson’s polyfunctional model of language
and the concept of  the structural  dominant.  A deeper intellectual  affinity
between  the  phenomenological  philosopher  and  the  structural  linguist  is
indicated  in  their  agreement  on  the  fundamental  importance  of  a  poetic
dimension of experience and expression.  
My concern thus lies predominantly in the area of conceptual analysis,
not in that of intellectual history, or history of philosophy. Particularly, I am
interested in how a convergence of Merleau-Ponty and Jakobson might lead
to the development of concepts that can be applied to empirical problems in
1 This is not to say that there was no direct influence of Jakobson on Merleau-
Ponty,  especially  in  the  works  after  Phenomenology  of  Perception.  Holenstein
(1976b, 22) mentions that Merleau-Ponty visited Jakobson 1948 in New York
and that they met again later in Paris. Waldenfels frequently refers to Merleau-
Ponty’s  acquaintance  with  Jakobson’s  linguistics.  Most  direct  references  in
Merleau-Ponty’s published work, however, are to the structural linguistics of de
Saussure.  
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the social sciences, for example cultural anthropology. Within the context of
the present essay, I can only point in the direction of this project, indicating
its significance and possibility. It needs to be stated, however, that the effort
to initiate, or, depending on one’s assessment of the relation between them,
uncover a dialogue between Merleau-Ponty and Jakobson is not merely of
historical interest. The problems addressed in such a dialogue, the nature of
the relations between objective empirical “facts” and subjective experiential
“meanings”, between structure and agency, determination and volition, have
not  been  solved  by  the  various  following  “post”-developments  (post-
modernity, post-structuralism, post-humanism, post-phenomenology). Inves-
tigations at the cross-section of phenomenology and structuralism promise
new insights into old problems that continue to haunt the empirical sciences
as well as philosophy itself.     
Earlier  efforts  of  highlighting  the  structural  dimensions  of  Merleau-
Ponty’s thinking date from the 1970s and 1980s, a reaction to the promi-
nence  gained  by  structuralism  in  a  wide  variety  of  sciences  and  in  the
intellectual scene in general (Edie 1971, 1987; Grathoff & Sprondel 1976,
Schmidt 1985). Many of these efforts concentrate on Merleau-Ponty’s theory
of language (Edie 1971, 1987; Waldenfels 1976), an understandable focus
considering the role played by structural linguistics as a kind of vanguard of
structuralism. Despite this linguistic orientation there was, however, no study
on  affinities  or  convergences  between  Merleau-Ponty  and  Jakobson.  In
addressing this topic, the present essay puts itself at odds with Holenstein
(1976a, 1976b) who regarded it as a mistake that contemporary phenomeno-
logists  were  trying  to  establish  a  dialogue  with  structuralism  from  the
perspective of existential and hermeneutic phenomenology. He argued that
Husserl’s phenomenology provided a much more compatible counterpart to
the “systematically strictly defined concepts” of the structuralists (Holenstein
1976b,  54/55).  Although Holenstein  (1976b,  22)  acknowledges  Merleau-
Ponty  as  the  most  original  phenomenologist  after  Husserl,  he  dismissed
Merleau-Ponty’s contact with structural linguistics as not “particularly fertile”
(Holenstein 1976b,  22),  and consequently  didn’t  explore possible  connec-
tions.  I  am proposing here that  Merleau-Ponty and Jakobson are  suitable
interlocutors for a dialogue between phenomenology and structuralism. In
distinction from other studies of  Merleau-Ponty’s “structuralism”, I extend
the view from the focus on the philosophy of  language towards Merleau-
Ponty’s  conceptions  of  non-verbal  behaviors  and  of  human  existence  in
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general,  therefore moving closer  to the main themes of  Phenomenology of
Perception (see also Waldenfels 1985). 
The decision to limit the scope of investigation to one of Merleau-Ponty’s
works requires some explanation, even though Phenomenology of Perception is
regarded by many as his “main work”. One reason is heuristic, as this limi-
tation allows me to move closer to the text itself, rather than making general
statements about Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy. Another reason has to do with
my disciplinary background as cultural anthropologist. Over the last three
decades, Merleau-Ponty’s theory of the sentient body as origin and medium
of cultural signification has exerted great influence in anthropology (see, for
example, Csordas 1990, 1999; Jackson 1989). It was predominantly through
reading Phenomenology of Perception that anthropologists became acquainted
with  Merleau-Ponty’s  thought,  and  the  same  applies  to  other  disciplines
outside  of  philosophy.  Thirdly,  to  consider  the  presence  of  structuralist
concepts in Phenomenology of Perception allows us to get a better sense of their
applicability  beyond  their  original  linguistic  context  than  a  focus  on
Merleau-Ponty’s texts devoted specifically to the problem of language. 
Nevertheless, it needs to be kept in mind that Merleau-Ponty’s notion of
structure, while prominent in all of his writings, did not remain static over
the course of his career (see Edie 1987, 55-70, Waldenfels 1985). Strictly
speaking,  the  following  remarks  thus  only  apply  to  a  specific  phase  of
Merleau-Ponty’s  thinking.  On  the  other  hand,  there  is  also  considerable
continuity in the way this philosopher formulated and approached problems,
in particular between Phenomenology of Perception and the project of a pheno-
menological ontology in The Visible and the Invisible. In this sense the follo-
wing remarks also make a – very modest and limited – claim to contribute to
the understanding of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy.  
2 | Jakobson and Merleau-Ponty: Phenomenological Structuralism 
and Structural Phenomenology
As Elmar Holenstein has shown in his book on Jakobson, the antagonism
between structuralism and phenomenology was not one of essence or origin,
but was produced performatively by representatives of the respective methods
or styles of thinking at a later phase of their historical development. In the
beginning there was a recognition shared by phenomenologists and structura-
lists that both were not only concerned with the same intellectual problems,
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but also tried to solve them by compatible means. By initiating the shift from
the positivist conception of experience as reflection of autonomously existing
objects to a conception of experience in terms of relations between observer
and observed, phenomenology can even be regarded as the “historical and
logical ‘condition of possibility’ of structuralism” (Holenstein 1976a, 3). At
the turn of the 20th century, phenomenology was the first philosophical mo-
vement that stressed, in form of Husserl’s revision of the concept of inten-
tionality, the priority of relations before substance. This change of perspective
is commonly regarded as the “first principle” of a structuralist way of thin-
king: 
At its simplest, it claims that the nature of every element in any given
situation has no significance by itself, and in fact is determined by its
relationship to all  the other  elements  involved in that  situation. In
short, the full significance of any entity or experience cannot be per-
ceived unless and until it is integrated into the structure of which it
forms a part. (Hawkes 1977, 18).
Husserl’s investigations into the essential correlations between acts of con-
sciousness  and experiential  objects  manifested the first explicit  instance of
this way of thinking.2 
An awareness of the affinity between phenomenology and structuralism
was particularly pronounced in Jakobson who, as a young student in Mos-
cow, came into contact with Husserl’s philosophy. In particular the second
volume  of  Logical  Investigations made  a  deep  and  lasting  impression  on
Jakobson that would shape and penetrate his entire approach to language.
Holenstein claims that “there is hardly a basic and methodological concept of
structural  linguistics  and  poetics  that  does  not  undergo  an  explicit  and
implicit  phenomenological  determination  and  elaboration  by  Jakobson”
(1976a,  3),  and  proposes  the  term  “phenomenological  structuralism”  as
designation of Jakobson’s theoretical perspective.  Since Ricoeur’s polemical
characterization  of  Levi-Straus’s  structuralism  as  “Kantianism  without  a
transcendental subject” (cf. Holenstein 1976a, 47), the alleged absence of the
subject as center of intentionality and agency is one of the main criticisms
raised  by  phenomenologists  against  structuralists  and  post-structuralists.
2 Especially the third of his Logical Investigations, titled “On the Theory of Wholes
and Parts”
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Holenstein, however, dismisses this allegation as too absolutist for structura-
lism in general, and as non-applicable to Jakobson in particular: 
The subject in Jakobson’s structuralism appears in three shapes: (1) as
observer, who is himself part of the observation; (2) as intersubjective
and (3) unconscious producer and recipient of the linguistic message.
Instead of being Kantian, in the sense of a philosophy aimed at the a
priori  and  universal  forms  and  laws  of  its  object  and  without  a
“transcendental subject,” Jakobson’s structuralism proves to be Kantian
with  a  more  sophisticated  concept  of  the  subject.  The  subject  is
extended to the dimensions of intersubjectivity and the unconscious.
(Holenstein 1976a, 48)
There are thus plenty of reasons, historical as well as intellectual, to claim
Roman Jakobson as a kind of mediator between phenomenology and struc-
turalism whose work can be used to reconnect phenomenological philosophy
with developments in the empirical sciences in productive ways. 
A similar claim can be made for Merleau-Ponty, although it has not been
argued as systematically as for Jakobson; in Merleau-Ponty’s case the evidence
is more scattered.3 Nevertheless, there is a widespread sense among readers of
Merleau-Ponty that he is the “most structuralist” of the eminent phenomeno-
logists. Referring to the philosophy of language, James Edie (1971, 299), for
example, speaks of the “unique place” of Merleau-Ponty: “He is about the
only phenomenologist whom the Structuralists are wont to treat with respect
and whose authority and support they readily invoke.” Edie (1987, 56/57)
distinguishes  four  phases  in  Merleau-Ponty’s  structural  thinking:  the  early
“Gestaltist” phase of Structure of Behavior, published in 1942;4 the dialectical
understanding of structure in Phenomenology of Perception (1945); a “properly
structuralist” phase characterized by intensive studies in structural linguistics,
from the end of the 1940s to the mid 1950s; a “post-structural phase” lasting
3 Despite  their  differences  in  philosophical  outlook,  Merleau-Ponty  was  friends
with Claude Levi-Strauss, his colleague at the College de France. After Merleau-
Ponty’s unexpected death, Levi-Strauss dedicated his book The Savage Mind to the
philosopher.  Merleau-Ponty  also  communicated  with  the  Dutch  linguist  and
philosopher Hendrik Pos, and engaged critically with his work, e.g.  in the essay
“On the Phenomenology of Language” (Merleau-Ponty 1964a) 
4 But already finished in 1938, according to Waldenfels (1985, 57)
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until Merleau-Ponty’s death in 1961, connected with his project of a pheno-
menological ontology sketched in The Visible and the Invisible. 
While this neat division might be justified with respect to the specific
issue of an influence of structural linguistics on Merleau-Ponty’s conception
of language, I believe that there is  a broader current running through his
thinking that can be labelled structural, if not structuralist. This current is
certainly  discernible  at  the  end  of  Phenomenology  of  Perception,  when
Merleau-Ponty sums up his reflections on the question of human freedom:
I am a psychological and historical structure. Along with existence, I
received a way of existing, or a style. All of my actions and thoughts
are related to this structure, and even a philosopher’s thought is merely
a way of making explicit his hold upon the world, which is all he is.
And yet, I am free, not in spite of or beneath these motivations, but
rather by their means. (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 482)
And the very last sentence of the book is taken from a quote of the writer
Saint-Exupery and reads: “Man is a knot of  relations, and relations alone
count for man” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 483) These are structuralist formu-
lations  indeed,  but  they  also  indicate  the  specific  place  which  Merleau-
Ponty’s  structural  thinking  holds  within  the  context  of  his  philosophy.
Merleau-Ponty never portrays structures as existing autonomously from their
implementation in concrete behaviors and actions. For him there is simply
no separate  domain  of  laws,  rules  or  regulations  that  would  determine  a
situation by being applied to it. Rather, experiential reality springs from an
indeterminate, or dialectical meeting between structure and behavior, where
the essence of one consists in expressing itself in the other: structures must
necessarily be thought of as structuring, as processes of differentiation and
articulation unfolding in concrete matter, or empirical content. On the other
hand, matter or content is never amorphous, is always structured or given
form as perceptual sense. The dialectical relationship between structure and
behavior  is  at  the  heart  of  Merleau-Ponty’s  conception  of  the  body  in
Phenomenology  of  Perception:  Lived  perceptual  experience  as  disclosed  by
phenomenological description is impossible without the acknowledgment of
an inborn embodied knowledge of the world. We would never know what a
visual object is if, before the appearance of any particular object, we weren’t
already familiar with the multiple ways in which it presents itself to us, in
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relation to other things in the field of vision, as a type of resistance against a
certain level of illumination, as an articulation of spatial depth, etc. We arrive
at the unity of the perceptual object not through some sort of calculation,
but  through an intuitive  assurance  about  the  structures  of  the  perceptual
world  that  is  given  to  us  with  our  body.  In  this  sense,  the  body  in
Phenomenology  of  Perception appears  as  a  set  of  structures,  or  a  dynamic
system, and its experience of itself consists in a  body schema in which every
part of the body is assigned a function in relation to the whole. Paradoxically,
however, the body schema, while belonging to our organic constitution, only
operates by establishing relationships to the world:
If my body can ultimately be a “form,” and if there can be, in front of
it, privileged figures against indifferent backgrounds, this is insofar as
my body is  polarized by its  tasks,  insofar  as  it  exists  toward them,
insofar as it coils upon itself in order to reach its goal, and the “body
schema” is, in the end, a manner of expressing that my body is in and
toward the world. (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 103)
In  other  words,  the  perceptual  world is  always  structured  because  the
perceiving body itself  is  a  process  of  structuration; at  the same time, this
structuration is only possible because the body relates to the world through
perception and movement. Structure and behavior go hand in hand, none
can be said to precede the other; their relationship is chiasmic, hence essen-
tially ambiguous. 
James Edie’s  assessment of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of  language can
therefore be extended to his structural thinking in general:
In  short,  what  most  interested  Merleau-Ponty  in  the  structuralist
attempt to establish phonological, morphological and syntactical rules
(which we call la langue) according to which we must speak in order to
make sense, is the dialectical relationship of these rules or structures to
actual acts of usage. On the one hand the structures of language are
nothing  other  than  the  scientific  description  of  speech  acts,  and
therefore are ontologically dependent on a community of speakers. On
the other hand this community of speakers must already – in some
dumb, sub-understood manner – follow the rules of  la langue even
while their language patterns are being described. Here we have a good
76 | B. Leistle, Polyfunctionality, Structural Dominant, Poetic Function
dialectical situation. Neither is prior to the other, neither can subsist
without  the  other,  neither  is  independent  of  the  other.  Each  is
necessary  for  the  constitution  of  meaning  and  the  articulation  of
thought. (Edie 1987, 60)
The same can be said for Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the relationship
between body and world in perception, and of his notion of human existence
as  the movement of  taking up a de facto situation (Merleau-Ponty 2012,
173). If we accept Holenstein’s claim regarding Jakobson’s insistence on the
necessary presence of subjectivity as the field in which linguistic structures
must realize themselves, we can justifiably assume that to him as well the
problem posed itself in dialectical terms. At this point, however, we also are
confronted with a major difference between the two scholars that relates to
their  respective  disciplines:  For the  linguist  Jakobson,  the question of  the
relationship between structure and subject, or between language and speech-
act,  could remain undetermined,  as  long as  it  did not  interfere  with  the
investigation of concrete linguistic phenomena. For the philosopher Merleau-
Ponty, the uncovered indeterminacy became the actual problem, the situation
that needed to be investigated and clarified.5 Committed to a radical inquiry
into Being, for  Merleau-Ponty bracketing the question of  the relationship
between sentient subject and worldly structure for heuristic reasons was not
an option. In the following period of his work (from the late 1940s to the
mid 1950s), he attempted to address the problems revealed in Phenomenology
of  Perception by developing a unified theory of  expression able  to include
language, artistic expression, and bodily gesture in one analytical framework.
In this attempt, posthumously published under the title  Prose of the World,
Merleau-Ponty  drew  extensively  on  structural  linguistics.  Ultimately,
however, he abandoned the project of  Prose of the World and began to work
on a “phenomenological ontology”, a project ended by his sudden death in
1961.  In the manuscript  fragment  The Visible  and the  Invisible, Merleau-
Ponty  returned  to  the  problem  of  embodiment.  He  now  described  the
fundamental  indeterminacy  of  body-subject  and  world  in  terms  of  an
intertwinement,  or  chiasmus.  The  relationships  between  body  and  world
uncovered  by  phenomenological  description  are  only  possible  when both
partake in the same Being, when they are of one “flesh”. Using this kind of
“open”, “evocative” vocabulary, Merleau-Ponty sought to finally overcome the
5 See also the passage from Merleau-Ponty 2012, 178, quoted infra.
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oppositions between consciousness and object, mind and matter, subject and
structure, which “thematic”, “propositional” language cannot but reproduce.
It makes sense to assume that the language of structural linguistics with its
tendency towards  disambiguation  and strict  definition is  included in  this
indictment, and that this is part of the reason why Merleau-Ponty ultimately
turned  away  from  it.  Be  this  as  it  may,  such  disciplinary  differences  in
concern and outlook must be kept in mind when bringing a phenomeno-
logical  philosopher  and a  structural  linguist  in  communication  with  each
other.,   
Before moving on to a more detailed investigation of concepts, it is worth
mentioning another area of possible, this time topical, convergence between
Jakobson  and  Merleau-Ponty.  Both  exhibited  an  extraordinary  interest  in
aesthetic  and  poetic  expression  and  creation.  There  is  general  agreement
among  Jakobson-scholars  that  avant-garde  art  constituted  a  formative
influence on his conception of structural linguistics, and provided ongoing
inspiration for this scholarly work (see for example, Holenstein 1976a, 23;
Pomorska 1987, 2-4). As a young man, when he was a founding member of
the Moscow Linguistic Circle, he was a close friend of the poets Xlebnikov
and Majakovskij, whose work deeply and lastingly influenced his perspective
on language. More than that, under the pseudonym “Aljagrov” he also wrote
poetry that he called “supraconscious” (Pomorska 1987, 2), and considered
himself as a futurist (Rudy 1987). As a linguist and semiotician, Jakobson
assigned the poetic, or more generally speaking, the aesthetic dimension, a
central  function  in  human communication.  Similarly,  Merleau-Ponty  was
greatly interested in artistic production, which he viewed as a paradigmatic
instance  of  the  meaning-producing  processes  unfolding  in  experience  in
general.  He  placed  particular  focus  on  painting  to  which  he  devoted  a
number of essays over the whole course of his career,6 but references to the
arts  appear  frequently  and figure  prominently  in  his  works.7 This  shared
preoccupation with aesthetics and the convergence resulting from it, provides
further basis for a dialogue between Merleau-Ponty and Jakobson.      
6 See  the  following  essays:  “Cezanne’s  Doubt”  (Merleau-Ponty  1964b,  9-25);
“Indirect  Language  and the  Voices  of  Silence”  (Merleau-Ponty  1964a,  39-93);
“Eye and Mind” (Merleau-Ponty 1964c, 159-190).
7 See for example the section “The unity of the body and the unity of the work of
art” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 152/153).
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3 | Jakobsonian Concepts: Poly-functionality, Poetic Function and 
Structural Dominant
Throughout his career, Roman Jakobson was concerned with questions of
poetics, with the defining features of verbal art. In his famous essay “Linguistics
and Poetics”  (1985 [1960]),  he integrated this  concern in  an encompassing
conception of human language as mode of communication. Jakobson’s model
might already be familiar to some readers, but to present it once more in its
outline will make the following arguments easier to follow. 
In “Linguistics and Poetics”, Jakobson presented the poetic as an integral
dimension of  linguistic  communication, constituting one of  six  functions of
language. These functions are in turn derived from the necessary elements, or
constitutents, as Jakobson calls them, of any act of linguistic communication: a
sender (or addresser) sends a message to a receiver (or addressee) who interprets it in
relation to a linguistic  and/or extra-linguistic  context.  Moreover,  the message
must be in a code common to both sender and receiver, and transmitted via a
form of contact between them (Jakobson 1985, 150). 
From each of these six basic elements, Jakobson derives a different function of
language. He is also able to show that the various functions correspond to, and
are highlighted in, particular language phenomena. In relation to the addresser,
the linguistic act has  emotive function; it expresses his or her attitude towards
what is being communicated. The emotive function or “emotivity” of language
becomes graspable in the phenomenon of interjections or in the necessary contri-
bution of the tone of voice to the meaning of an utterance. To the addressee
corresponds a conative function of language that consists in the elicitation of some
kind of behavior on the part of the receiver of a message. Linguistic examples of a
focus on this function are vocative and imperative forms that, by definition, pri-
marily require a behavioral response. The context-factor is connected with the
referential function of language, its capacity to transmit information about lin-
guistic and extra-linguistic reality. This function is traditionally regarded as the
defining function of language, and as the basis of its role in human cognition;8
Jakobson, however, while not denying the importance of referentiality, insists
that the other language functions make essential communicative contributions.9 
8 For an example of this traditional  notion see Karl Bühler’s  Organon-Model of
language in his classical Sprachtheorie (1934, only translated into English in 1990)
to which Jakobson admits to be indebted for his own conception. 
9 In this respect, he can be related to J.L. Austin’s theory of performative speech
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Code leads to the recognition of a metalingual function and comes to the
fore in forms of language use in which language itself becomes the theme of
communication. This  is  the case  for  example in acts  of  paraphrasing and
explaining meanings, as they frequently occur in processes of language acqui-
sition, both of first and second languages (Jakobson 1985, 153). The phatic
function rests on the necessary presence of a form of contact between sender
and receiver, and is accentuated in messages referring to the mode of contact,
or the channel of transmission (for example, the question: Are you listening
to me?, or the sounds emitted to signal that one is still on the phone).
The poetic function, finally, and this is what Jakobson is mostly concerned
with in his famous essay, is defined through its focus on the message itself, on
its composition and materiality. Poetic function or poeticity is particularly
prominent in verbal art, especially poetry, but it also features in all acts of
everyday  communication  in  which  the  attention  of  the  participants  is
directed toward the concrete form of the message (as is the case in advertise-
ments, or political slogans). It is worth to quote Jakobson at some length on
this matter:
The  set  (Einstellung)  toward  the  MESSAGE as  such,  focus  on  the
message for its own sake is the POETIC FUNCTION of language.
This function cannot be productively studied out of touch with the
general problems of language, and, on the other hand, the scrutiny of
language requires a thorough consideration of its poetic function. Any
attempt to reduce the sphere of poetic function to poetry or to confine
poetry  to  poetic  function  would  be  a  delusive  oversimplification.
Poetic  function  is  not  the  sole  function  of  verbal  art  but  only  its
dominant, determining function, whereas in all other verbal activities
it  acts  as  a  subsidiary,  accessory  constituent.  This  function,  by
promoting the palpability of  signs, deepens the fundamental  dicho-
tomy  between  signs  and  objects.  Hence  when  dealing  with  poetic
function, linguistics cannot limit itself to the field of poetry. (Jakobson
1985, 153, capitalization in original) 
In Jakobson’s conception language emerges as a multi-dimensional and
poly-functional  mode  of  communication.  The  unity  of  the  speech-act  is
differentiated into a multiplicity of diverse elements and functions. A struc-
acts, developed in his How to Do Things with Words, which appeared in 1962.
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tural hierarchy between these functions determines the identity of the com-
municative act. A specific act is defined by the function that features most
prominently in it, that  dominates the structural hierarchy, orients all  other
functions in relation to it, and in this sense determines the unity of which
they form parts. In the case of the poetic function, its dominance in verbal
art manifests itself in a specific process of restructuration: “The poetic function
projects  the principle of equivalence from the axis of selection into the axis of
combination” (Jakobson 1985, 155, italics in original). This means, instead of
being limited to the process of  selection between various possible language
elements, similarity/dissimilarity becomes a criterion for the  combination of
selected elements.10 Poetic devices like meter and rhyme create a similarity-
relationship between elements in the same line, or between different lines,
and thereby direct the attention, or as Jakobson says, produce a “set” towards
the form of the linguistic message. By restructuring linguistic communication
in this way, the dominance of the poetic function alerts the language user to
an existential, but often forgotten, or should we say, repressed fact: that the
sign is different from the object for which it stands, and that their association
is based on a convention which is always already established. Poetry brings to
our  awareness,  for  example,  that  the sounds of  language,  while  of  course
embedded in the phonological system of a particular language, carry a certain
value for the expression of the meaning of the world: 
Sound symbolism is  an undeniably objective relation founded on a
phenomenal  connection  between  different  sensory  modes,  in
particular between the visual and auditory experience…..(W)hen, on
testing, for example, such phonemic oppositions as grave versus acute
we ask whether /i/ or /u/ is darker, some of the subjects may respond
that this question makes no sense to them, but hardly one will state
that /i/ is the darkest of the two. (Jakobson 1985, 169)
These expressive properties of language sounds are not positive, universal
qualities, as naïve theories of sound symbolism and onomatopoeia assumed.
They are inevitably subject to structural relations within phonological sys-
10 The terms “selection” and “combination” refer to the “Two-Axis-Theory” of lan-
guage which Jakobson borrowed from de Saussure.  For his development of the
theory and its application to the problem of aphasia, see his important essay “Two
Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasic Disturbances”, in Jakobson 1971).
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tems. Empirical languages may positively affirm the symbolic properties of
sound,  as  does  Russian  when  it  features  a  grave  vowel  in  its  word  for
“night”, /noč/ and an acute vowel in its word for “day”, /d,en,/; or they may
run counter this sound symbolism, as the French does with /jour/ and /nuit/.
While  such  violations  often  go  unnoticed  in  everyday  speech,  in  poetic
language they are brought to the fore, as can be illustrated by the inclination
of French poets to surround /jour/ with clusters of words containing acute
vowels, or placing /nuit/ in an environment dominated by grave vowels (see
Jakobson 1985, 169). In this way, as Jakobson says, the sound meaning nexus
becomes palpable to language users.11
Most important for  my present argument is,  however,  the structuralist
conception  of  a  hierarchical  arrangement  governed  by  a  dominating
function, or dominant. “Poetic function is not the sole function of verbal art
but  only  its  dominant,  determining  function”,  writes  Jakobson;  other
functions make subsidiary, yet essential  contributions to poetic communi-
cation.  Even  the  most  abstract  poetry  contains  some  kind  of  referential
meaning, and the expression of the attitude of the poet towards the message
is  an  important  component  of  many  verbal  art  works.  In  this  manner,
Jakobson’s poly-functional model allows us to distinguish between different
genres of verbal art. The dominance of poetic function is verbal art’s overall
defining criterion, but for example “epic poetry” can be distinguished from
“lyric poetry” by a different arrangement of the subsidiary functions: in the
first, poetic function enters a close relationship with referential function ; in
the second, poeticity is accentuated by emotivity. Non-poetic modes of verbal
communication can similarly be characterized by a difference in the struc-
tural  dominant,  and  a  corresponding  arrangement  of  other  functions.
Technical  or  mathematical  language  is  defined  by  the  dominance  of  the
11 In Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty describes the expressive properties
of language sounds in strikingly similar terms: “If we consider only the conceptual
and final sense of words, it is true that the verbal form – with the exception of the
inflections – seems arbitrary. This would no longer hold if we took the emotional
sense  of  the word into  account,  what  we have  above  called its  gestural  sense,
which is essential in poetry, for example. We would then find that words, vowels,
and phonemes are so many ways of singing the world, and that they are destined
to represent objects, not through an objective resemblance but because they are
extracted  from them,  and  literally  express  their  emotional  essence”  (Merleau-
Ponty 2012, 193)
82 | B. Leistle, Polyfunctionality, Structural Dominant, Poetic Function
referential and, possibly metalingual functions, but that doesn’t mean that an
expressive or poetic element cannot enter communication in the sciences.12
In a military boot camp, communication is one-sidedly geared towards the
behavioral responses of the addressee, but phatic and referential functions are
certainly co-present in commandos and orders. 
This may suffice to demonstrate that Jakobson’s conception of a multi-
dimensional  structure  governed  by  a  structural  dominant  provides  a
heuristically fertile tool to distinguish between, describe and analyze different
modes of communication. Summed up in the seminal 1960 essay, this con-
ception was  already in  place  in  the  1930s,  when Jakobson was  a  leading
member of the Cercle linguistique de Prague.13 It is noteworthy, and relevant
for  a  dialogue  between  Jakobson and  Merleau-Ponty,  that  from early  on
Jakobson regarded his model not as restricted to problems of poetics in the
narrow  sense.  In  his  1935  essay  “The  Dominant”,  in  which  he  credits
Russian Formalism with the original formulation of the concept, he not only
claims that it allows a more precise description of processes of literary evo-
lution,  through the  study  of  changing relationships  between canonic  and
marginal genres and styles. He also extends the application of the concept
beyond the realm of verbal art, and ultimately even beyond the domain of
aesthetics:
We may seek a dominant not only in the poetic work of an individual
artist and not only in the poetic canon, the set of norms of a given
poetic school, but also in the art of a given epoch, viewed as a parti-
cular whole. For example, it is evident that in Renaissance art such a
dominant,  such  an  acme  of  the  aesthetic  criteria  of  the  time,  was
represented by the visual arts. Other arts oriented themselves towards
the  visual  arts  and were  valued  according  to  their  closeness  to the
latter.  On the other  hand,  in  Romantic  art  the supreme value was
assigned to music. Thus, for example, Romantic poetry oriented itself
toward  music:  its  verse  is  musically  focused;  its  verse  intonation
12 Karl Bühler (1990, 38/39) mentions the handwriting of the mathematician as an
example of the emotivity, or expressivity of mathematical communication. If the
poetic dimension wasn’t present in mathematics at all, it would remain incom-
prehensible why some mathematicians are commended for the “elegance” of their
demonstrations.  
13 For a short synopsis of the stages of Jakobson’s career, see Holenstein 1976a, 8-12
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imitates musical melody. This focusing on a dominant which is in fact
external to the poetic work substantially changes the poem’s structure
with regard to sound texture, syntactic structure, and imagery; it alters
the  poem’s  metrical  and strophical  criteria  and its  composition.  In
Realist aesthetics the dominant was verbal art, and the hierarchy of
poetic values was modified accordingly. (Jakobson 1978 [1935], 83)
Many anthropologists will feel a skepticism towards such sweeping gene-
ralization of entire cultural eras, just as phenomenologists might feel uncom-
fortable with some aspects of Jakobson’s structuralist vocabulary which makes
liberal use of the term “determination”, as we have seen. But it needs to be
kept  in  mind that  Jakobson is  talking  about  structural  relationships,  not
about autonomous domains or entities. The dominance of one art form, and
of one sensory modality is only relative, as is the subordination of the other
arts and senses under the dominant. The identification of a dominant is an
interpretive statement, not an objective one that could be proved by means of
scientific  demonstration.  As  we shall  see,  we  encounter  the  same type  of
interpretation and understanding in Merleau-Ponty.   
In  an  essay  from  the  same  period  titled  “What  is  Poetry?”  (1934),
Jakobson examines the relationships between poetic expression and personal
life using the example of several poets, in particular the Czech romantic poet
Karel Macha. Jakobson is intrigued by the different ways in which the same
events  and  persons  are  thematized  in  Macha’s  poems  and  in  his  private
diaries, a difference particularly marked in the treatment of erotic and sexual
themes. Jakobson argues that no mode of communication has a privileged
relation to reality and truth: 
Is  it  possible  that  the  relation  between  lyric  poetry  and  the  diary
parallels the relationship between Dichtung and Wahrheit?14 Not at all.
Both aspects are equally valid; they are merely different meanings, or,
in more scholarly terminology, different semantic levels of the same
object, the same experience, or, as the filmmaker would put it, two
different takes of a single scene (Jakobson 1981, 744).
If all modes of expression are related to an underlying experiential core,
yet none of these modes provides a privileged access, then it follows that a
14 German for “Fiction” and “Truth” 
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pure expression of experience is impossible.15 What is indicated here is the
notion of an existential unity underlying the various forms in which a person
expresses himself or herself, a nexus to which all these forms relate but that
never coincides with any of them. This is one of the core elements of the
conception of human existence that Merleau-Ponty develops in Phenomeno-
logy of Perception.                
4 | Structural Thinking in Phenomenology of Perception
The Jakobsonian conception of  a  poly-functional  unity  governed by a
structural dominant is implied frequently in Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology
of  Perception and  I  will  discuss  three  instances  in  which  this  implication
becomes particularly obvious: Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of the relationship
between specific symptoms and illness in the case of the brain-injured patient
Schneider; the relationship between sexuality and human existence; and the
integration of different senses into the inter-sensory unity of the body. Before
doing so, however, it needs to be emphasized that the motif of an essentially
differentiated unity, or a unified difference, emerges as one of the key themes
in  Phenomenology  of  Perception.  The ambiguity and indeterminacy resulting
from this contradictory conjunction has even been claimed as the hallmark of
Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy in general. Throughout Phenomenology of Perception,
Merleau-Ponty presents unity and differentiation, universality and particularity,
objectivity and subjectivity as intertwined with each other; although opposed to
each other, no element of the relationship can be thought of without the other.
Rather than being an impediment, the partial perspective imposed by one’s body
is what enables one to enter a world of articulated objects and positional space
(Merleau-Ponty 2012, 70/71). Time only becomes accessible to us as a totality
through our insertion into a “field of presence” which constitutes our temporal
perspective  through which the  dimensions  of  the  past  and the  future  open
themselves (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 438/439). Everywhere in human existence we
are confronted with the paradoxical fact that what puts us in contact with reality
and truth is at the same time what prevents reality and truth from ever becoming
absolute and indubitable.
That said, and the creativity of Merleau-Ponty’s adaptation of structuralist
ideas  notwithstanding,  I  believe  that  an  explicit  application  of  Jakobson’s
15 In the same essay, Jakobson (1981, 746) writes: “Every verbal act in a certain sense
stylizes and transforms the event it depicts”.
Acta Structuralica Special Issue 2 | 85
concepts has the potential to add clarity to some of Merleau-Ponty’s discussions
in  Phenomenology  of  Perception.  In  his  discussion of  the  case  of  Schneider,
through  which  he  develops  important  points  about  the  relation  between
consciousness and motricity, Merleau-Ponty also addresses the problem of the
relationship  between  the  pathological  unity,  Schneider’s  illness,  and  the
multiplicity of symptoms, through which this unity expresses itself. Merleau-
Ponty rejects interpretations that locate the illness one-sidedly in a particular
sphere. It is not permissible, he argues, to regard the impairment of Schneider’s
vision and a resultant loss of visual representations as underlying cause of his
other tactile, motoric and cognitive disturbances. Rather, Schneider’s behavior
must be understood as an existential unity, an expression of his total being and
relationship to the world. In the context of this unity, every alteration of a
composite element inevitably effects changes in the whole, including all other
components.  Schneider’s  loss  of  vision  does  not  leave  his  sense  of  touch
unaffected,  but  modifies  it  in  accordance  with  an  overall  structure  that  is
Schneider’s illness. To describe this existential unity, Merleau-Ponty introduces
the  term  “intentional  arc”:  All  of  Schneider’s  behaviors,  whether  in  the
motoric,  verbal  or  sexual  sphere  are  characterized  by  a  certain  disinterest,
inertness and passivity.  This style of acting, thinking and experiencing is what
connects the various clusters of symptoms with each other; Schneider’s illness
ultimately consists in a modification of his whole existence. Merleau-Ponty says
that his intentional arc has “gone limp” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 137). While
Schneider’s  existence  thus  constitutes  a  totality,  its  differentiation  into  a
multiplicity of self-regulated domains must also be acknowledged: 
…..If consciousness is an activity of projection, which deposits objects
around itself like traces of its own acts, but which relies upon them in
order  to  move  on  to  new  acts  of  spontaneity,  then  we  understand
simultaneously that every deficiency of “contents” has an effect upon the
whole of experience and begins its disintegration, that every pathological
weakening has to do with all of consciousness – and that, nevertheless, the
disorder each time attacks consciousness from a certain “side,” that in each
case  certain  symptoms are  predominant in the clinical  picture  of  the
illness,  and  finally  that  consciousness  itself  can  suffer  the  illness.  By
attacking the “visual sphere,” the illness is not limited to destroying certain
conscious contents, namely, “visual representations” or vision in the literal
sense; rather, it attacks vision in a figurative sense, of which the former is
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but the model or the emblem – the power of “surveying” or “dominating”
(überschauen)  simultaneous  multiplicities  and  a  certain  manner  of
positing the object or of being conscious. (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 138)
In other words, the prominence of vision in Schneider’s pathology, while
not  causing  the  illness,  is  no  accidental  ingredient  either.  In  terms  of
Jakobson, the visual serves as the structural dominant of the illness; more
than other  senses,  sight  expresses  a  power  of  distancing oneself  from the
immediate  situation,  of  “surveying”  and  “dominating”,  a  capacity  that
Schneider has lost.16 Other disorders and symptoms of Schneider display the
same theme, but vision dominates in that it expresses the lost faculties in a
focused and organized manner. Schneider’s  illness affects all  aspects of his
existence,  but  it  is  concentrated  in  the  visual  domain  because  here  the
existential  transformation  that  is  the  disease  achieves  its  most  direct
expression. As Merleau-Ponty suggests in the above quote, other pathological
conditions  can  be  characterized  by  different  dominants.  The  structural
relationships  between different  modes  of  communication  as  conceived by
Jakobson can thus be transposed into the domain of clinical pathology.17
Another important point concerns  the  ontological  status  of  structural-
phenomenological concepts like “intentional arc” or “existential style”. Here,
too,  Jakobson’s  phenomenological  structuralism  has  the  potential  to  add
clarity  to  Merleau-Ponty’s  arguments.  Just  as  the  poem  itself  cannot  be
identified with the structural analysis of poetic function and other functions
of language, so the concrete existence of the patient can never be equated
with the description of a certain existential style. Both types of analyses are
interpretations that necessarily introduce transformations into their objects;
in other words, they remain models and must not be confused with reality. It
seems to me that Merleau-Ponty, in his own development of his philosophy
in later years, especially with the concept of “hyper-reflection” in The Visible
and the Invisible (1968, 38) has moved in this direction.                
16 One of the symptoms that Merleau-Ponty (2012, 107) discusses is Schneider’s
inability to project himself into a “virtual situation”. He has, for example, great
difficulties to execute the gesture of a military salute upon request and is only able
to do so when he adopts the full bodily stance of a soldier, thus by making the
situation immediately present to himself. 
17 Jakobson himself has applied his structural approach to pathological phenomena
in “Two Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasic Disturbances” (1971).
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In Phenomenology of Perception the concept of a differentiated unity also
plays a prominent role in the chapter “The Body as a Sexed Being”. In a now
familiar manner, Merleau-Ponty presents the relationship between sexuality
and human existence in terms of ambiguity and indeterminacy. On the one
hand, an individual’s life always expresses itself in his or her sexuality, and
sexuality can thus never be regarded independently from its insertion into an
existential totality. The expression of existence in sexual behavior is not direct
and equivocal: a dictatorial will to power can correlate with ascetics, as well as
with promiscuity. The significance of sexuality can only be deciphered within
the existential context.
On the other hand, however, no manifestation or domain of existence is
completely autonomous from the sexual sphere. Sexuality is a continuously
present “atmosphere”, comparable to an “odor or sound” that emanates and
diffuses from its origin (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 171): 
There is osmosis between sexuality and existence, that is, if existence
diffuses throughout sexuality, sexuality reciprocally diffuses through-
out existence, such that it is impossible to identify the contribution of
sexual motivation and contribution of other motivations for a given
decision or action and it is impossible to characterize a decision or an
action as “sexual” or as “nonsexual” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 172).
Nevertheless, there obviously must be a way to distinguish between situations
that are more sexual and those that are less sexual. Here Jakobson’s concept of a
plurality of functions governed by a structural dominant provides us with an
elegant solution. Sexual situations are those in which “sexuality” is the dominant,
structurally determining existential dimension, just as a work of verbal art is
defined  by  the  dominance  of  “poeticity”.  Implied  in  this  use  of  the  term
“sexuality” is a distancing from its meaning in everyday language that connects it
exclusively  with  the  genital  sphere.  As  Merleau-Ponty  makes  clear  in  his
discussion of psychoanalysis in  Phenomenology of Perception, sexuality must be
understood as a way of being-toward-the-world, paralleling the psychoanalytic
concept of libido (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 161). 
But  just  as  dominance  of  the  poetic  function  does  not  exclude  the
contribution  of  the  other  language  functions  to  the  work  of  art,  so  the
dominance of sexuality, or of any other existential domain, never becomes
exclusive. Even in sexual situations so defined, the “economic”, the “political”
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and the “religious”, to name just a few conventionally recognized dimensions
of human existence, will make themselves felt with varying degrees of clarity
and urgency. One only needs to think about the sexual encounter between a
client and a sex worker, in comparison to a pair of lovers engaging in con-
sensual, non-commercial sex to produce an example of a different structural
arrangement between the sexual and the economic. As feminist scholars have
argued convincingly, the political-economical is not absent from the private
sphere and intimate relationships,  but the quality of its  presence certainly
varies for both cases.  From the perspective of the sex worker the business
aspect of the encounter may outweigh the sexual aspect, leading to a shift in
the dominant of her experience. If that is indeed the case and the same shift
does not occur in the client’s experience, it might not be justified to say that
both are sharing a situation. Such instances, however, occur in all types of
social  relationship  and  might  thus  be  much  more  frequent  than  usually
acknowledged.  Therefore,  a  further  question  would  be  how people  orch-
estrate their behaviors when their experiences are governed by different domi-
nants, a topic that was, for example, treated in depth in the work of Alfred
Schütz (Schütz 1967, Schütz and Luckmann 1973).
This is  just an example for how Merleau-Ponty’s reflections can be ex-
tended  towards  concrete  empirical  phenomena  by  bringing  them  into
conversation with concepts developed by Jakobson. 
It is interesting to note that Merleau-Ponty himself went in this direction,
in a long footnote appended to the sexuality-chapter dealing with historical
materialism. Just as psychoanalysis presents an existential approach to sexu-
ality, so historical materialism must be understood as an existential approach
to history: 
History has no single signification; what we do always has several senses,
and this  is  how an existential  conception of  history is  distinguished from
both  materialism  and  spiritualism.  ….The  conception  of  law,  morality,
religion and economic structure are co-signified in the Unity of the social
event, just as the parts of the body are all co-implicated in the Unity of a
gesture,  or  just  as  “physiological,”  “psychological”,  and  “moral”  motives
intersect in the Unity of an action……But one of the orders of signification
can be  considered dominant  in  each case,  one  gesture  can be  considered
“sexual”, another one “loving,” and still another “warlike,” and even within
coexistence, some period of history can be considered as above all cultural, or
primarily political  or economic. To ask whether our current history has  a
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primarily  economic  sense  and whether  our  ideologies  give  nothing but  a
secondary or derivative sense of it is a question that not longer comes from
philosophy, but rather from politics. It is a question that will only be resolved
by researching which scenario fits the facts more completely, the economic
scenario or the ideological one. Philosophy can only show that resolving the
question is possible by starting from the human condition. (Merleau-Ponty
2012, 178)                               
While the meaning of words like “sexual”, “loving” and “warlike” remains
vague, the affinity to Jakobson’s concepts is not to be denied here. There is
reason to hope that further study in this direction could uncover ways to
formulate more precise distinctions between different existential “functions”,
in analogy to the language functions posited by Jakobson. Such an under-
taking would be particularly fruitful for anthropology where the concept of
“total social fact” developed by Marcel Mauss addresses similar relationships
between unity and differentiation.18
Perhaps the most obvious and, at least from a cultural  anthropological
standpoint,  empirically  most  promising  example  of  structural  thinking  in
Phenomenology of Perception is provided by Merleau-Ponty’s portrayal of the
relationship of the different senses within the unity of the sentient body. In
his typical dialectical style, Merleau-Ponty first shows that “each sense has its
world” (Ibid., 230), meaning that the single sensory modality functions as a
mode of communication with the world that cannot be fully substituted by
or translated into other modalities. He then demonstrates how the various
senses are embedded into a structural whole, and how any impairment or loss
of sensory faculty implies a restructuration of the totality: “The blind person’s
world and the world of the normal person differ not merely in the quantity
of the matter available to them, but moreover in the structure of the whole”
(Ibid.,  233).  From this,  it  follows  that  the  senses  must  be  able  to  inter-
communicate,  that  they are distinct,  yet  not separate from each other.  In
other words, the relationships between them are again of the type already
encountered between the multiplicity of symptoms and the entity of disease,
and  between  various  existential  dimensions  and  existence  as  a  whole:  a
totality whose internal differentiation is essential to it. 
Merleau-Ponty illustrates the distinctness and interconnectedness of the
different senses by discussing studies  with congenitally blind persons who
gained eyesight after surgery. He opposes interpretations that accept state-
18 Compare for example Mauss 2011, 3, 44/45
90 | B. Leistle, Polyfunctionality, Structural Dominant, Poetic Function
ments of the patients that “they had not known what space was before they
could see” as  proof that  spatial  experience was grounded in sight.  Rather,
such statements must be acknowledged as confirmation that touch and sight,
while  both  being  spatial,  articulate  spatiality  in  specific  ways.  A  spatial
concept like the simultaneity of perceptual objects, for example, is not alien
to touch, but originates  in the tactile  sphere in what finds itself  at  arms’
length, and can be touched at the same time with different hands. By extra-
polating from this origin, a blind person is able to form a concept of simul-
taneity between objects that lie at greater distance from each other. In sight,
however, this extended concept must not be constructed, but is immediately
given  in  sensory  experience.  It  is  the  astonishment  over  this  immediate
intuition, according to Merleau-Ponty, that the formerly blind express. 
The  difference  between  the  various  sensory  modalities  can  again  be
described in  terms of  a  changing dominant  in  the  sense  of  Jakobson.  For
Merleau-Ponty, the senses themselves are poly-functional – each of them gives
us  access  to  the  world  as  totality,  all  of  them  unfold  experience  in  the
dimensions of spatiality, temporality, objectivity and subjectivity, etc.19 But the
phenomenological dimensions shared by all senses are arranged in particular
ways in the specific sense, as we have just seen for spatiality in sight and touch.
By enabling us to speak of a relative structural dominance of one or several of
the phenomenological dimensions (spatiality, temporality, etc.) in a particular
sensory  register,  Jakobson’s  structuralist  concepts  allows  us  to  distinguish
between the different senses; at the same time they allow us to uphold their
necessary  integration  into  a  bodily-existential  totality.  Put  simply,  the
phenomenological dimensions are treated in analogy to Jakobson’s language-
functions: while one dimension, or a combination of dimensions is dominant
in one sense (e.g. a certain kind of positional spatiality in sight), that domi-
nance cannot be taken to mean that other dimensions (e.g. a more situational
understanding of space, as is accentuated in hearing) are absent. Like the non-
dominant  functions  in  Jakobson’s  model  of  linguistic  communication,  the
secondary phenomenological dimensions play subsidiary roles in the sensory
communication between body-self and world.  Of course,  much descriptive
and analytical work remains to be done to clearly identify the relevant pheno-
menological  dimensions of  sensory experience.  It  is  more than likely that
lived experience cannot be reduced to “constituent elements” in the bold and
elegant manner in which Jakobson did this for language. But an application
19 For a congenial conception of sensory plurality, see Erwin Straus, 1963
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of Jakobsonian concepts has, in my opinion, the potential to lead to a less
reductive, hence phenomenologically more adequate portrayal of the struc-
tural processes that organize sensory experience. In this way, the relevance of
Jakobson’s structuralism goes beyond a clarification of certain aspects found
in Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception and extends to phenomeno-
logy in general. 
As already alluded to in the previous paragraph, the concept of structural
dominant is also relevant for the description of the relationship between the
senses  in  the  unity  of  the  body.  Merleau-Ponty leaves  no doubt  that  the
various  modalities  of  sensory  experience,  what  we  commonly  refer  to  as
“seeing”, “hearing”, “touching”, etc.  do not exist autonomously from each
other, at least not in lived experience in the “natural attitude”: 
There is but a narrow margin available to sensory experience: either
the sound and the color, through their own arrangement, sketch out
an object – the ashtray, the violin – and this object speaks directly to
all of the senses; or at the other extreme of experience, the sound and
color are received in my body, and it becomes difficult to restrict my
experience  to  a  single  sensory  register:  it  spontaneously  overflows
toward all the others (Ibid., 236).
Experience  is  primordially  synaesthetic  and  communicates  with  the
total  thing;  each  sense  is  ultimately  nothing  but  a  particular  way  to
articulate  the  same  perceptual  object.  The  senses  intercommunicate  in
relation to an intersensory world,  enabled by a  synthesis  that  is  always
already achieved. 
Yet, as we have seen, Merleau-Ponty regards the fact of differentiation
as equally essential as the fact of synthesis: “the unity and the diversity of
the senses are truths on the same level” (Ibid., 230). This, however, raises
the  problem  how  concrete  modes  of  natural  experience  are  to  be
distinguished from each other.  Some phenomenological  anthropologists
have indeed suggested that on the pre-objective level, sensory modalities,
for example hearing and seeing “are virtually indistinguishable from each
other:  vision  is a  kind  of  hearing  and  vice  versa”  (Ingold  2011,  245).
Using again  the  concept  of  structural  dominant  we  can  arrive  at  more
precise  distinctions  between  modes  of  lived  experience.  While  the
synaesthetic nature of experience is guaranteed through the conception of
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the  body  as  a  multi-sensorial,  i.e.  poly-functional  unity,  a  concrete
experience,  or  mode  of  experiencing  can  be  characterized  through  a
careful description of the dominant sensory register.20
Philosophical  and  anthropological  debates  about  the  hierarchy  of  the
different modalities in the human sensorium have often suffered from claims
of an absolute sovereignty of the dominant sense. Merleau-Ponty’s conception
of  an intertwining  of  the  senses  in  a  primordially  synaesthetic  experience
rejects  such claims,  reducing  absolute  to relative  dominance.  The famous
thesis of Western modernity as an age dominated by vision (see Levin 1993)
can  thus  be  qualified  and  revised.  Taken  by  themselves,  Merleau-Ponty’s
formulations of the problem in Phenomenology of Perception remain, however,
too abstract and general as to allow for a satisfactory treatment of empirical
realities like, for example, the preference for visual methods of representation
in the sciences. In this respect, complementing Merleau-Ponty’s with Jakob-
son’s thought has considerable heuristic value. The same applies to cultural
anthropology  where  in  the  field  of  “sensorial  anthropology”  far-reaching
claims have been made recently regarding the varying organization of  the
sensorium in different cultures: “….There is nothing to prevent the ear or
the nose from being any less tyrannical than the eye in some other cultural
formation of the senses” (Howes 2003, XXII). Taken in an absolute sense,
such statements are clearly untenable phenomenologically, if only because of
the  importance  of  human  language  in  all cultures,  which  is  indubitably
grounded in a nexus of  hearing and sight (see Jakobson 1971, 701). The
power of any sense to achieve a “tyrannical” dominance is thus limited by the
universal  presence  of  human language,  which emphasizes  a  specific  com-
bination of senses. But to reject the absoluteness of a claim is not to have
solved the problem posed, in this case the cultural variability of sensory ex-
perience. From an anthropological perspective, the combination of Jakobson’s
structuralist thinking and Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of the body opens up
interesting paths of exploration. For example, the question of dominance of
one  sensory  mode  can  be  qualified  by  that  of  the  relation  between  the
dominant  and  the  “auxiliary”  or  “secondary”  modes.  Following  Merleau-
Ponty it is clear that all cultures must be synaesthetic on the pre-objective
level;  in  a  culture  in  which  “sight”  serves  as  the  structural  dominant,
“hearing”, “touching”, “smelling” and “tasting” nevertheless possess cultural
significance and contribute to the production of meaning. A careful appli-
20 For an effort in this direction in the field of ritual studies, see Leistle 2006
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cation of the concept of structural dominant has the potential to raise the
discussion to a higher level, even if we accept the everyday meaning of the
term “sense”. 
5 | Conclusion – The Poeticity of Language
Usually, the structuralist study of language and the phenomenological in-
vestigation of  existence  are  perceived as  vastly  different  preoccupations.  The
former aims at understanding the relationships between empirical (linguistic)
facts, the latter sees these facts as a means to move beyond the empirical into a
transcendental realm, even if it is aware that it can never leave the empirical
behind. This difference in orientation poses problems for any inquiry into the
possibilities of conceptual exchange between structuralism and phenomenology.
If this project is to be undertaken, Merleau-Ponty and Jakobson are extremely
suitable representatives of their respective sides. In the preceding pages, I have
concentrated  on  how  certain  themes  of  Merleau-Ponty’s  Phenomenology  of
Perception can be read through the lens of Jakobson’s structuralism, in particular
his concepts of poly-functionality and structural dominant. I have argued that
this  reading  has  the  potential  to  clarify  some  of  Merleau-Ponty’s  thoughts,
making  them more  applicable  to  empirical  questions,  as  they  are  posed  in
disciplines like cultural anthropology. I would like to end this essay by showing
how Jakobson and Merleau-Ponty agree regarding the essentially poetic quality of
language. 
I  have  mentioned previously  that  throughout  his  career  Jakobson  was
interested in questions of art and poetics. More than just pursuing an in-
terest, he regarded aesthetic problems as central to the study of language in
general. What is the reason for this persistence, and how can it be justified
against  charges  of  arbitrariness?  What  makes  the  poetic  function  special
among the language functions? As an answer to these questions, Jakobson has
pointed towards the reflexivity of poetic language and its capacity to make
the connection between sign and object, as well as their dichotomy, accessible
to consciousness. In the essay “What is Poetry?”, he asks the consequential
question of why such consciousness is necessary: 
Because besides the direct awareness of the identity between sign and
object (A is  A1), there is a necessity for the direct awareness of the
inadequacy of that identity (A is not A1). The reason this antinomy is
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essential is that without contradiction there is no mobility of concepts,
no mobility of signs, and the relationship between concept and sign
becomes automatized.  Activity comes to halt,  and the awareness  of
reality dies out. (Jakobson 1981, 750)
The reflexivity of poetic function thus allows language-users to grasp the
process of signification itself, thereby reaffirming language’s crucial faculty to
create new meanings. While this is an important point, as an explanation for
the privileged role  of the poetic function it is  also somewhat tautological.
Poetic function is important because it does what poetic function does. At
this  point,  I  feel  that  Merleau-Ponty’s  philosophy  of  language  can  com-
plement Jakobson in meaningful ways.  In the famous language-chapter of
Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty (2012, 202/203) introduces the
distinction  between  speaking  speech and  spoken  speech to  characterize  the
relationship  between  expressive  act  and  linguistic  structure.  In  speaking
speech, the language system reconfigures itself following an “unknown law”,
producing a new and unanticipated expression that could not be predicted by
previous states of the system. But once performed, speaking speech becomes
part  of  the universe  of  significations, “constitutes a linguistic  and cultural
world” (203); in other words, speaking speech becomes spoken speech, and
can be repeated as an already available signification: 
From these acquisitions, other authentic acts of expression – those of
the  writer,  the  artist,  and the  philosopher  –  become possible.  This
ever-recreated opening in the fullness of being is what conditions the
first speech of the child and the speech of the writer, the construction
of the word and the construction of concepts. Such is  the function
revealed through language, which reiterates itself, depends upon itself,
or that like a wave gathers itself together and steadies itself in order to
once again throw itself beyond itself (Ibid., 203).
In  the  concrete  life-world,  language  is  always  already  constituted;  the
creative  speech  act  (“speaking  speech”)  and the  language  system (“spoken
speech”) are thus dialectically interwoven. The creation of new meaning is
only possible through taking up already existing significations, including the
structural relationships between them. But the very existence of these signi-
fications and structures depends on the ever-present possibility of original,
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creative speech. Even in its structural aspects, language must, therefore, be
conceived as essentially open to transformation, a “wave that gathers itself
together and steadies itself in order to once again throw itself beyond itself ”,
as Merleau-Ponty puts it evocatively. The speaking subject is not in control of
this movement of transcendence in language. Rather, it appears as the loca-
tion in which the process of taking up and rearranging structures happens.
Ultimately, Merleau-Ponty conceives of the linguistic subject as the capacity
to engage in this process, just as he regards the body-subject as fundamentally
synonymous with the perceptual faculties to bring the world of perception to
appearance.      
A parallel  understanding  of  language  and of  the  role  of  the  linguistic
subject underlies Jakobson’s conception of the poetic function: in the poetic
register, language transcends itself, it opens itself to its own transformation, a
process  that  is  inconceivable  through  a  static  understanding  of  structure.
Seen from a poetic perspective, language structure presents itself as inherently
dynamic,  as  movement of  transcendence; poetic function is  the means of
language to “gather itself in order to throw itself beyond itself ”. In it, lan-
guage becomes reflective, but this reflection is not grounded in the conscious
activity of a reflecting subject. Rather, it is language structure itself, through
an alteration of its basic operations of selection and combination that enables
speaking  subjects  to  get  a  sense  of  the  process  in  which  they  are  simul-
taneously immersed.21 Only in language’s poetic dimension do we catch a
glimpse at the constitutive operations and compositional principles of lan-
guage. Only here are we able to gain a cognitive hold of the very processes
that structure our speaking and thinking, however partial and fleeting that
hold may be.  Insofar  as  we  are  poets  even in  our  everyday speaking and
writing,  we  can  change  language,  can  connect  with  the  source  of  our
thinking, create new meaning. This is only possible when the existence and
centrality of the poetic function is acknowledged. In other words, language
wouldn’t be language if it wasn’t originally poetic. 
Merleau-Ponty’s  conception of  language in  Phenomenology of  Perception
echoes  Jakobson’s  emphasis  on  poeticity.  Moreover,  by  inserting  language
21 The limits of the subject’s ability to control the poetic process are addressed in
“Subliminal Verbal Patterning in Poetry” (Jakobson 1971, 136-147). The analysis
of unconscious structuration processes present in the poetry of Xlebnikov provides
a good example of what Holenstein called Jakobson’s “extended notion of sub-
jectivity”, see above. 
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into the existential context of bodily gesture and expression, Merleau-Ponty
shows that  human experience in general,  verbal  and non-verbal,  reflective
and  pre-reflective  is  essentially  poetic.  In  this,  he  provides  an  important
complement to Jakobson, who, although sometimes concerned with prob-
lems of general semiotics, approached his topic from the vantage point of
verbal language. His philosophical assumptions remained mostly implicit in
his theoretical and empirical research practice. Although Holenstein has desi-
gnated  Jakobson’s  philosophical  outlook  as  Husserlian,  rather  than  exist-
entialist, this article has shown that Jakobson’s structuralism and particular
his  poetics  are  compatible  with  basic  themes  of  Merleau-Ponty’s  pheno-
menology. A reading of Merleau-Ponty in Jakobsonian terms, and a reading
of Jakobson in Merleau-Pontian terms seems not only possible, but fertile
and worthy of further exploration.
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